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NOTES
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection After United States v.
Goodwin
I know it is usuelly the courts prosedure to give a larger sentence
when a new trile is granted. I guess this is to discourage petitioners.
Your Honor, I don't want a new trile I am afraid of more
tiine. . . .
Your Honor, I know you have tried to help me and God knows I
apreceate this but please sir don't let the state re-try me if there is any
way you can prevent it. 1

While the sixth amendment guarantees all criminal defendants
the right to a fair trial,2 tradition guarantees prosecutors almost unbridled discretion in deciding how to try cases.3 Often these competI. Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225,231 n.7 (W.D.N.C. 1966) (quoting a letter to
a judge from the successful petitioner in an earlier criminal case) (emphasis omitted), ojfd., 381
F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
2. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
3. Some degree of flexibility is essential if prosecutors are to be able to function effectively.
Courts have regularly acknowledged the need for prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g.,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 (1978); United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.) ("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charges shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once
brought.").
Prosecutors legitimately have substantial discretion over the allocation of investigative re•
sources. Cf. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU·
TION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 3.l(a), commentary, at 77 (Approved draft
1971) (prosecutors should be able to investigate suspected criminal acts on their own initiative
in some circumstances). In addition, prosecutors are free to bring charges selectively, indicting
some who commit a crime while permitting others to go free. For a comprehensive list of
selective prosecution cases, see cases cited in Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutor/al
Power, 94 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1521, 1540 n.71 (1981). Generally, these selective prosecution cases
involve equal protection, rather than due process rights. However, courts have recognized the
similarity between vindictive and selective prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 639
F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1981). In the post trial context, the two doctrines are almost indistinguishable. See Washington v. United States, 434 A.2d 394,396 (D.C. 1980) (en bane); State v.
Uebberheim, 263 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Iowa 1978).
Having picked a defendant, the prosecutor is then free to select what offenses he will
charge, see, e.g., Necochea v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 100 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1972),
whether he will employ penalty-enhancing statutes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3577 (1976),
and whether or not to plea bargain, see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
The extent of prosecutorial discretion has been extensively analyzed by commentators.
See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Frase, Tlte Decision to File Federal Crimi•
nal Charges: A Quantitative Study ofProsecutorial Discretion, 41 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 246 (1980);
Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO.
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ing guarantees confl.ict:4 when a desire to deter or punish the exercise
of basic rights motivates a prosecutor to bring more serious charges
against a defendant, 5 "fundamental notions of fairness embodied
WASH. L. REV. 659 (1981); Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutoria/ Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1980); LaFave, The Prosecutor's .Discretion in The
United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutoria/ .Discretion in
Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 439 (1974); Noll, Controlling a Prosecutor's Screening .Discretion
Through Fuller Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 697 (1978); Pizzi, Prosecutorial .Discretion,
Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court's Opinion in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 6 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 269 (1978); Bubany & Skillern, Taming the .Dragon: An Administrative Law far
Prosecutoria/ .Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 473 (1976); Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest ofan Ethical Standard· Guidancefrom the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145 (1973);
Note, Reviewability of Prosecutoria/ .Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 130
(1975); Comment, Prosecutorial .Discretion - A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled
.Discretion and its Potentialfar Abuse, 21 DE PAULL. REV. 485 (1971).
4. See Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,365 (1978); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139,
143 (5th Cir. 1978); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977).
5. The case law is replete with horror stories. For example, in the case of Clayborne Jamison, Jr., Jamison's counsel successfully moved for a mistrial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his own error during the opening statements at trial The prosecutor,
in apparent retaliation for this inconvenience, substituted a first degree murder charge for what
had previously been a second degree murder charge. Accordingly, all those who follow in
Jamison's footsteps have to presume that they must either permit erroneous convictions to
stand or face the possibility of increased charges at retrial See United States v. Jamison, 505
F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See af-ro United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188-89 (9th Cir.
1981) (increasing severity of charges following defendant's successful motion for mistrial);
United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (filing additional charge
following defendant's motion for release on bail), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Lovett v.
Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002, 1004 (1st Cir. 1979) (increasing severity of charge following defendant's motion for trial de novo with jury), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v.
Thomas, 593 F.2d 615, 624 (filing additional charges following defendant's demand to be sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charges), modtfted on other grounds, 604 F.2d 450 (5th Cir•.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 142 n.3 (5th Cir.
1978) (filing additional charges following defendant's successful appeal); United States v.
Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1978) (increasing severity of charges following defendant's
motion to dismiss under Speedy Trial Act); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir.
1977) (increasing severity of charges following defendant's petition for removal to federal
court and special plea of insanity), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978); James v. Rodriquez, 553
F.2d 59, 62 (10th Cir.) (filing additional charge following defendant's appeal), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 889 (1977); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.) (increasing number
of charges following defendant's motion for change of venue), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976) (increasing number of
charges following defendant's appeal); Colon v. Hendry, 408 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1969)
(increasing severity of charge following defendant's successful petition for writ of habeas
corpus); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (D.D.C. 1980) (increasing number and severity of charges following defendant's plea of no/o contendre); State v.
Hinton, 123 Ariz. 575, 578, 601 P.2d 338, 341 (1979) (increasing severity of charge following
defendant's successful motion to suppress inadmissible evidence); Johnson v. State, 396 A.2d
163, 165 (Del 1978) (increasing severity of charge following defendant's successful motion for
mistrial); Wynn v. United States, 386 A.2d 695, 697 (D.C. App. 1978) (increasing number of
charges following defendant's successful motion to dismiss); Cherry v. State, 414 N.E.2d 301,
306 (Ind.) (refiling of charges formerly dismissed following defendant's successful appeal), cert.
dismissed, 453 U.S. 946 (1981); Ronk v. State, 578 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Tex. 1979) (increasing
severity of charge following defendant's successful appeal). Cf. Longval v. Meachum, 651
F.2d 818, 820 (1st Cir. 1981) (more severe prison sentence than co-felon for defendant demanding right to jury trial), vacated andremandedfar reconsideration in light of United States v.
Goodwin, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998 (U.S. June 28, 1982); Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1258 (3d.
Cir. 1980) (more severe prison sentence in second trial for defendant demanding right to testify
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within the concept of due process"6 are violated. The doctrine of
prosecutorial vindictiveness7 then takes effect and bars prosecutors
from taking such impermissibly motivated actions. 8
In United States v. Goodwin, 9 the Supreme Court held that the
pretrial substitution of felony for misdemeanor charges following a
defendant's insistence on trial by jury does not give rise to a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens explicitly distinguished pretrial and posttrial charging
decisions, limiting the presumption of vindictiveness established by
Blackledge v. Perry 10 to the posttrial period. Initially, this result appears to signal further retrenchment of the due process protections
afforded criminal defendants. 11 More careful analysis, however,
reveals that Goodwin may lay the foundation for a reaffirmation of
the Blackledge prophylactic rule in the posttrial context where defendants need it most, and where lower courts, both state and federal, have consistently failed to enforce it.
This Note reformulates the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness in light of the distinction drawn in Goodwin between pretrial
and posttrial charging decisions. Part I recounts the development of
the vindictiveness concept, and argues that in extending the doctrine
beyond the factual settings which moved the Supreme Court to fashion its original prophylactic rule, the circuit courts have seriously
eroded an essential due process 12 safeguard. Part II critically examin his own defense). But see United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1978)
(right to return of impounded funds not protected from prosecutorial vindictiveness); United
States v. Thumhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1977) (when court declares mistrial on its
own motion, prosecutorial vindictiveness not triggered).
6. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
7. The term ''vindictiveness" was coined by the Supreme Court in North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), to characterize a judge's retaliatory action of penalizing a
defendant's exercise of his right to a new trial by imposing a harsher sentence. The phrase
"prosecutorial vindictiveness" has never been precisely defined. Generally, it refers to a prosecutor increasing charges against a defendant to retaliate for the assertion of a right. See note 5
supra. It only imposes limitations on prosecutors who have acted beyond the bounds of permissible discretion. See note 3 supra. Since the borderline cases between proper discretion
and impermissible vindictiveness do not lend themselves to easy categorization, the term
"prosecutorial vindictiveness" remains ill-defined.
While prosecutorial vindictiveness could result in a wide variety of prosecutorial actions,
courts commonly have focused on the prosecutor's decision to increase charges. Since this
decision must be made either prior to the first trial (pretrial) or following a reversal (posttrial),
this Note describes vindictiveness as "pretrial" or "posttrial".
8. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
9. 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982).
IO. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
I I. The lower courts have thus far cited Goodwin only to justify denying claims of vindictiveness arising out of pretrial prosecutorial conduct, and not to strengthen the posttrial safeguards against vindictiveness. See United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mauricio, No.
81-1564 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1982); United States v. Johnson, No. 81-2022 (5th Cir. July 20, 1982),
12. This Note defends a rule designed to prevent the government from punishing or deter-
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ines the distinction between pretrial and posttrial charging decisions
relied upon in Goodwin. Developing the logical corollary of the
Goodwin holding, this Part argues that just as the pretrial situation
does not warrant "an inflexible presumption of vindictiveness" 13
when prosecutors substitute more serious charges, such a presumption is fully warranted after an initial trial. During this posttrial period, defendants' interests reach their apex and the government's
interest in more serious charges significantly declines. Part III sets
forth a revitalized prophylactic rule which reflects this balance, and
responds to the possible objections to such an approach.
I.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROSECUTORIAL
VINDICTIVENESS CONCEPT

This Part traces the checkered history of the vindictiveness doctrine, which the Supreme Court first set forth in North Carolina v.
Pearce 14 and Blackledge v. Perry. 15 The realities of American criminal justice, however, compelled the Court to exempt plea bargaining
from the prophylactic effects of the Blackledge presumption of vindictiveness.16 The lower courts, meanwhile, developed a wide variety of standards, none of which provides the degree of posttrial
protection against vindictiveness required by Blackledge. The
Court's recent opinion in Goodwin calls these approaches into serious question, and suggests the need for a uniform vindictiveness
standard based on Blackledge, Bordenkircher, and the differences between pretrial ·and posttrial charging decisions which Goodwin now
indicates distinguish those cases.
A. Emergence of the Prophylactic Rule

The Supreme Court first articulated the concept of vindictiveness
in North Carolina v. Pearce, 17 where the defendant challenged the
ring criminal defendants from exercising their legal rights. Consequently, its argument draws
upon the practical realities of criminal justice, in a manner that might appear to confine its
force to the realm of ''policy." Yet the Supreme Court, in Pearce and its progeny, has consistently identified this policy of protecting the exercise oflegal rights against governmental intimidation as a fundamental element of due process. Either perspective suffices to justify
restraining prosecutorial vindictiveness. As an abstract principle of political morality, punishing explicitly legal behavior does violence to the culpability principle which lies at the hean of
our system of criminal law. See generally H.L.A. HART, PuNlSHMENT AND REsPONSIBlLITY
11-13 (1968); Allen, The Law as a Path to the World, 77 MICH. L. REv. 157, 159-66 (1978).
Happily, the Constitution of the United States provides a legal vehicle for honoring that principle in fact as well as theory.
13. United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (1982).
14. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
15. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
16. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
17. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Defendant Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to rape and
sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in prison. After a reversal because of the prosecutor's
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constitutionality of a judge's imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after the defendant had successfully attacked his first conviction. While the Court held that no constitutional standard - double
jeopardy, 18 equal protection, 19 or due process20 - prohibits an increased sentenceper se, the Court did hold that due process prohibits
increasing a sentence on retrial solely. because of vindictiveness
against the defendant.21
The Court reasoned that punishing defendants who exercise their
constitutional rights, by vindictively increasing their sentences at retrial, would be "patently unconstitutional."22 A court is " 'without
right to put a price on an appeal. A defendant's exercise of a right of
appeal must be free and unfettered.' " 23 Moreover, the Court emphasized that because such practices create an inherent threat to the
exercise of constitutional rights, they may deter other defendants
from exercising their rights.24
To free defendants from this apprehension of judicial vindictiveness, the Court prescribed a prophylactic rule. Whenever judges increase the severity of a sentence after retrial, their reasons for doing
so must affirmatively appear and "must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
proceeding."25 Additionally, the judge must include in the record
the factual data upon which he bases the increase.26
Blackledge v. Perry extended the concept of vindictiveness to
prosecutors.27 There, a prosecutor increased the charge against the
defendant from a misdemeanor to a felony28 after the defendant eximproper use of an involuntary confession, Pearce was retried and given a sentence that would
have increased his term in prison by almost three years.
18. 395 U.S. at 719-21.
19. 395 U.S. at 722-23.
20. 395 U.S. at 723-25.
21. 395 U.S. at 725.
22. 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
23. 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966)).
24. 395 U.S. at 724-25.
25. 395 U.S. at 726.
26. 395 U.S. at 726.
27. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Defendant Perry, an inmate of a North Carolina prison, was
charged with assault with a deadly weapon, a misdemeanor, after an altercation with another
prisoner. After conviction, Perry exercised his statutory right to a trial de novo in a higher
court on the misdemeanor charge. The prosecutor then increased the charge against Perry to a
felony, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.
28. Such an increased charge unfairly punishes the defendant in two ways. First, it subjects him to the possibility of a longer period of incarceration. 417 U.S. at 28. In addition,
conviction of a felony, rather than a misdemeanor, entails "serious collateral consequences"
regardless of the length of the sentence. 417 U.S. at 28 n.6. See also Special Project, Tlte
Collateral Conseljllences ofa Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929, 955-60 (1970); Note,
Civil .Disabilities ofFelons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403, 406-08 (1967).
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ercised his statutory right to a trial de novo. In holding that the due
process protection against judicial vindictiveness also extends to
prosecutorial vindictiveness, the Court declared:
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted
misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in
the Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly require increased
expenditures of prosecutorial resources before the defendant's conviction becomes final, and may even result in a formerly convicted defendant's going free. And, if the prosecutor has the means readily at
hand to discourage such appeals - by 'upping the ante' through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy - the State can insure thaf only the most hardy
defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial.29

Such language speaks to the interest in freedom from fear of vindictive recharging as well as to particular incidents of vindictiveness.
As in Pearce, the Court emphasized the need to protect defendants from this fear ofvindictiveness.30 Because such a fear can exist
even in the absence of an actual retaliatory motive, the Court held
that defendants need not demonstrate the existence of such a motive. 31 The Court did not, however, make it entirely clear what defendants do need to demonstrate. The Court indicated that "the Due
Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' " 32 The opinion strongly suggests
that the Court believes that when a defendant asserts the right to a
trial de novo, and the prosecutor subsequently seeks and obtains_ a
more serious indictment based on the same conduct as the original
indictment, the situation inherently poses a "realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness." The Court spoke without qualification of the defendant's right not to be reindicted in such a manner,33 and did not
remand the case to permit the prosecutor to justify the increased
charge. 34 As a result, contemporary commentators interpreted the
29. 417 U.S. at 27-28.
30. 417 U.S. at 28.
31. 417 U.S. at 28.
32. 417 U.S. at 27. At least one author interprets the elements of vindictiveness to be
three-fold: "l) a penalty or burden - the increased charge - resulted from the defendant's
exercise of his right of appeal; 2) a motivefar retaliation was present since the prosecutor has a
desire to conserve state resources; and 3) the same state representative,- the prosecutor, was
involved throughout the appellate procedure." Note, Criminal Procedure -Protection of.Defendants Against Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 54 N.C. L. REv. 108, 112-13 (1975) (emphasis in
original) (footnotes omitted).
33. The Court indicated that a person convicted of an offense must be able to pursue a trial
de novo ''without apprehension" of retaliation. 417 U.S. at 28. The Court also said that due
process "requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter into North Carolina's
two-tiered appellate process." 417 U.S. at 28.
34. 417 U.S. at 31 n.8. The Court did indicate, however, that charges might be increa_sed
when the prosecutor demonstrates "that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious
charge at the outset .••." 417 U.S. at 29 n.7.
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decision as absolutely prohibiting increased charges at retrial. 35
B. Decline of the Prophylactic Rule
Although Pearce adopted a prophylactic rule regarding judicial
vindictiveness, and Blackledge suggested an even stronger prophylactic rule to control prosecutors,36 these cases dealt expressly only
with posttrial vindictiveness.37 In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 38 a prosecutor, while engaged in plea bargaining, threatened to increase the
charges if the accused, Hayes, insisted on exercising his constitutional right to plead not guilty.39 The majority did not discuss the
35. See, e.g., Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal From a Plea Bargain Conviction: A .Due
Process Cure, 69 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 663, 692 (1974); Note, Criminal Procedure - Protection of
.Defendants Against Prosecutoria/ Vindictiveness, 54 N.C. L. REv. 108, 113 (1975); Note, "Upping the Ante" Against the .Defendant Who Successfal!Y Attacks His Guilty Plea: .Double Jeopanly and .Due Process Implications, SO NOTRE DAME LAW. 857, 877 (1975); Note, Criminal Law
-Exercise ofRight to Trial .De Novo - A Bar to Subsequent Felony Prosecutionfor the Same
Offense, ll WAKE FOREST L. R.Ev. 137, 141 (1975); Comment, Felony Charge After Appeal of
Misdemeanor Conviction: Violation of.Due Process, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q., 477, 481-82 (1975).
36. See United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250,255 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Blackledge suggests
no balancing test It adopts a prophylactic rule designed to spare courts the unseemly task of
probing the actual motives of the prosecutor in cases where objective circumstances suggest a
realistic possibility ofvindictivene~."), revd., 102 S. Ct. 2485 •(1982).
31. See United States v. Jamison, SOS F.2d 407, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Pearce makes it
clear that the exercise of post-conviction rights generally are [sic] not to be burdened by the
possibility of retaliation.").
On its face, Pearce cannot be applied to pretrial activities, since resentencing cannot occur
until retrial. Since reindictments can issue before trial, however, Blackledge can be read to
constrain pretrial prosecutorial actions.
There are two other cases in which the Supreme Court has made clear that vindictiveness
can be found at retrial, but has refused to do so on the facts before it. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17 (1973), held that a higher sentence imposed by a jury at a second trial could not be
vindictive where the jury was unaware of the length of the prior sentence and could not be
retaliating for the earlier result 412 U.S. at 26-27. The Court held that "[t]he first prerequisite
for the imposition of a retaliatory penalty is knowledge of the prior sentence." 412 U.S. at 26.
Similarly, in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court held that a higher sentence
imposed by a new court in a trial de novo was not the result of impermissible vindictiveness.
Again, the Court emphasized that when a sentence is imposed by a different authority - a
new judge - who is "not even informed of the sentence imposed in the inferior court," there is
little risk of vindictiveness. 407 U.S. at 116-18.
The Supreme Court has addressed the vindictiveness issue, indirectly, in one other instance. Certiorari in Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970), was dismissed as improvidently
granted when it became "clear that there was no claim that the higher sentence received on
retrial was a product of vindictiveness." Chq/fin, 412 U.S. at 25-26. Absent such an allegation,
there was no claim that ''the due process standard of Pearce" had been violated. 398 U.S. at
320. Cf. United States v. Gambert, 433 F.2d 321, 323 n.S (4th Cir. 1970) (''Moon stands for the
proposition that an issue does not arise as to the retroactive application of the constitutional
standards of Pearce where there is no claim of vindictiveness on the part of the resentencing
judge.") (emphasis in original).
38. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Hayes was found guilty of forging a check for $88.30, an offense
punishable by a term of two to ten years in prison.· Before trial, the prosecutor had offered to
recommend a five-year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty, but indicated that he would seek
an indictment under a habitual offender provision if Hayes insisted on pleading not guilty.
Hayes pleaded not guilty, was found guilty, and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.
39. 434 U.S. at 358 n.l. For authority establishing the constitutional basis of the right to
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issue in terms of vindictiveness,40 concluding instead that retaliation
could not occur in the plea bargaining context "[I]n the 'give-andtake' of plea bargaining there is no such element of punishment or
retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."41
While Bordenkircher clearly reaffirms the legitimacy of plea bargaining,42 the precise scope of its holding was not immediately apparent.43 Although some courts held that Bordenkircher applies only
to vindictiveness in plea negotiations,44 it has been suggested that its
plead not guilty, see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 56 n.2 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
40. Justice Blackmun dissenting, did frame the issue as one of vindictiveness: "[I]n this
case vindictiveness is present to the same extent as it was thought to be in Pearce and in
[Blackledge J; the prosecutor here admitted . . . that the sole reason for the new indictment was
to discourage the respondent from exercising his right to a trial" 434 U.S. at 367 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In addition, several lower courts found Bordenkircher to
permit actual vindictiveness: "Bordenkircher holds that actual retaliatory behavior is acceptable, at least in the plea bargaining context." United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). See also State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 629, 633
P.2d 1225, 1227 (1981) ("Bordenkircher was the only case presenting pretrial activity, and
there, despite clearly vindictive conduct, the Court declined to apply the doctine.") (emphasis
added); Holderman, supra note 3, at 30 ("As a result of the [Bordenkircher] decision, most
federal courts have applied a more permissive standard approving seemingly vindictive conduct in the plea bargaining setting.") (footnote omitted).
41. 434 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted). Plea bargaining, by its very nature, penalizes the
exercise of the right to trial by jury. See, e.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1978). No principled distinction exists between the threat of bringing
additional charges and the threat of refusing to drop charges brought initially for the purpose
of inducing a guilty plea. See United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2491 n.10 (1982).
42. In the aftermath of Bordenkircher, lower courts have been quick to approve retaliatory
actions taken by prosecutors during the plea bargaining process. See, e.g., United States v.
Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978); Montgomery v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 457, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Litton Syss., Inc., 573 F.2d 195,
198-200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978); Baker v. State, 425 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind.
1981); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1978). But see People v. Walker,
84 Ill. 2d 512, 522-24, 419 N.E. 2d 1167, 1174-75 (1981) (limiting Bordenkircher to defendants
who had prior notice of possible higher sentence). ·
43. Different interpretations of Bordenkircher have been offered. Compare United States
v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 315-16, 319 (E.D. La. 1981) (Bordenkircher limits vindictiveness
to instances in which government's action traced solely to defendant's exercise of rights), with
McCoy & Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REv. 887,
920-21 (1980) (Bordenkircher establishes that the right to trial is not absolute; it is counterbalanced by the efficiency of plea bargaining). One court has held that bringing state, rather than
federal, charges against a defendant who refuses to cooperate with the prosecutor comes within
the Bordenkircher analysis. Miller v. Superintendent, Otisville Correctional Facility, 480 F.
Supp. 858, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
44. Bordenkircher appears to be a very narrow opinion. The Court limited its holding to
"the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case . . . ." 434 U.S. at 365. In
addition, the Court's rationale applies solely to the plea bargaining process: "[T]here is no
such element of punishment or retaliation [in plea bargaining] so long as the accused is fr~e to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer." 434 U.S. at 363. Accordingly, many courts have limited Bordenkircher to the plea bargaining context. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 633
F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). See Pizzi, supra note 3, at 291;
Smaltz, Due Process Limitations on Prosecutorial Discretion in Re-Charging Defendants, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347,376 (1979). More generally, the Court tends to view plea bargaining as a particularly important part of the criminal justice system. E.g., Blackledge v. Allison,
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rationale applies to any pretrial action by the prosecutor.45 While the
latter approach seems too broad,46 under either of these analyses
Bordenkircher does not apply to a posttrial situation. Unfortunately,
the circuit courts - perhaps responding to a perceived transition in
the broader perspective of the Court - heeded the holding, and
even in some cases the rationale, of the Bordenkircher decision, but
blurred the distinction between pretrial and posttrial vindictiveness
standards. This led to the development of various approaches to
vindictiveness, all of which derogated the posttrial presumption of
vindictiveness the Court had unambiguously established in
Blackledge. 41
Thus, as the circuit courts have considered the application of the
431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). See generally Davidson & Kraus, Criminal Procedure, 1919 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 27, 27-52 (1979). Thus, it is hardly surprising that Bordenkircher carves a narrow exception to grant prosecutors more flexibility when they are engaged in plea negotiations.
It is clear, conversely, that Pearce and Blackledge do not apply to plea bargaining. See Ehl
v. Estelle, 656 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1459 (1982); Frank v.
Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 885 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), modified on other grounds on rehg., 646
F.2d 902 (per curiam), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 148 (1981) ("We find the rule of North Carolina
v. Pearce to be completely inapplicable to post-plea sentencing proceedings."); Martin v.
Blackbum, 606 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911 (1980) ("It is highly
questionable whether Pearce applies to plea bargaining situations.").
45. See United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 458 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J,, dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). See also State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 630, 633 P.2d
1225, 1228 (1981) ("It is unnecessary to impose a presumption of vindictiveness in pretrial
settings.").
46. Such an approach would permit a prosecutor to increase charges should a defendant
seek a jury trial, a change of venue, or the exercise of other rights. See sources cited in note 5
supra. To permit actual retaliation for the assertion of these rights seems, on its face, manifestly unjust.
47. Several suggestions have been made as to how to limit the scope of the doctrine. The
Fifth Circuit applies one standard when the reindictment is for the same criminal activity as
the original indictment and a separate standard when the reindictment is for distinct criminal
activity. See note 55 i'!fra. See also United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 988 (2d Cir. 1974).
Judge Engel has suggested distinguishing rights that go to innocence or guilt from "purely
collateral" rights. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 463 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (Engel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
An alternative approach might distinguish between statutory and constitutional rights. See
Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: An Examination of Divergent Lower Court Standards and a
Proposed Framework for Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REv. 431 (1981). In this view, denial of a
statutory right merely requires the state to show a rational basis for its action. Denial of a
constitutional right, in .contrast, requires the showing of a compelling state interest. The
courts, however, have flatly rejected such a statutory/constitutional distinction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (1980); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d
1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976). Bui see United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir.
1980) (en bane) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). The essential repugnance of vindictiveness, the punishment of legally protected behavior, remains identical
whether a statute or the constitution protects the rights whose exercise is punished.
Such an analysis would also result in the application of the ''unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine to vindictiveness claims relating to a constitutional right. See Note, supra, at 459-60.
The courts have consistently rejected this possibility. See Chaffin v. Synchcombe, 412 U.S. 17
(1977). Finally, this analysis hinges on the existence of a compelling state interest in plea
bargaining. Such an interest, however, exists only in the minds of those possessing "considerable imagination." McCoy & Mirra, supra note 43, at 905 n.92.
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vindictiveness concept to pretrial situations,48 they have also taken a
more lenient attitude toward prosecutorial practices. A number of
courts have expressed concern about unjustified and harmful judicial
encroachment on prosecutorial discretion, particularly at early stages
in criminal proceedings.49 Some courts have refused to apply the
vindictiveness doctrine to the pretrial context. so Many courts have
tried to reconcile the need for some control of vindictiveness before
trial with the need for greater prosecutorial discretion during this
period.51 To do so, these courts have retreated from the prophylactic
rule that the Blackledge decision suggested. Although Goodwin requires such a retreat in the pretrial situation, the circuit courts' failure to recognize expressly a pretrial/posttrial distinction has
undercut the constitutional protection that Blackledge mandated in
the posttrial context.52
·
The approaches taken by the circuit courts can be divided into
48. See, e.g., United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1974) (Pearce not
limited solely to sentencing after retrial).
49. See United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 461 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981) ("A test for prosecutorial retaliation that too
easily lets a defendant challenge prosecutorial conduct will have the undesirable effect of curbing prosecutorial discretion to a significant degree. . . . I would find very few cases in the pretrial stage in which the prosecutor's conduct appeared impermissibly to retaliate for the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right, such that the prosecutor should be called upon to
explain his action."); State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 631, 633 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1981) ("Imposition of a pretrial presumption of vindictiveness would interfere with proper prosecutorial
discretion.").
50. See United States v. Herrera, 640 F.2d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding Pearce and
Blackledge inapplicable when the defendant is neither resentenced nor reindicted); Frank v.
Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 885 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) ("The Pearce rule applies only to sentencing after retrial . . . •") (emphasis in original), modified on other grounds on rehg., 646
F.2d 902 (per curiam), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 148 (1981); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d
449, 457 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (Merritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981)
(''The Supreme Court has never applied the concept of 'vindictiveness' announced in Pearce
and [Blackledge] to a prosecutor's actions during the trial and pretrial stages of a criminal
case."); State v. Moritz, 293 N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (Iowa 1980); State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627,
629,633 P.2d 1225, 1227 (1981) ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has never applied the vindictiveness notion to a prosecutor's actions in the pretrial and trial stages of a criminal case."). In
addition, the Sixth Circuit has cited the fact that a case involves pretrial conduct as the basis
for distinguishing it from Blackledge. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d at 452.
5 I. Some judges have expressly recognized the need for laxer standards during the pretrial
period. See cases cited in note 49 supra; United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 253 (6th Cir.
1979) (Keith, J., dissenting), vacated, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 927 (1981); United States v. Schiller, 424 A.2d 51, 56 (D.C. App. 1981). Many courts have
tacitly recognized this need, by adopting a more relaxed standard when the prosecutorial vindictiveness concept is expanded to cover both pretrial and posttrial situations. See generally
notes 55-56 & 58-64 infta and accompanying text.
52. Commentators have made the same error. By failing to recognize the need for a pretrail/posttrial distinction, they, too, have retreated from the prophylactic rule needed in posttrial situations. See, e.g., Note, Proseculoria/ Vindictiveness: .Divergent Lower Court
Applications oJ the .Due Process Prohibition, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 324 (1982); Note,

Proseculorial Vindictiveness: Expanding the Scope oJProtection lo Increased Sentence Recommendations, 10 GEO. LJ. 1051 (1982); Note, A 'Realistic Likelihood oJ Vindictiveness!· .Due
Process Limitations on Prosecutorial Charging .Discretion, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 693. In the light
of Goodwin, such approaches have become academic.

204

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:194

three categories. 53 First, a number of circuits have adopted a balancing test that requires courts to consider all the facts of a particular
case to determine whether there is a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. 54 Second, at least one circuit has come very close to requiring
53. Given the inconsistencies among the circuits, any such classification will be somewhat
arbitrary. See, e.g., Note, 70 GEO. L.J. 1051, 1068-70, supra note 52 (four different standards);
Recent Developments, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: An Examination ofJ)ivergent Lower Court
Standards and a Proposed Frameworkfor Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 431 (1981) (three different standards). In one sense, all of the circuits have a similar standard; none will tolerate
prosecutorial conduct that presents a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness." See Note, 1981
U. ILL. L. REv. 693, supra note 52. But this phrase does no more than describe a result. The
classification presented here characterizes circuit court standards according to the showing required of defendants before a court will invoke this description. Indeed, it may be that the
categories discussed by this Note partake of more analytical rigor than those actually relied on
by the lower courts, which frequently appear to base their decision on a Gestalt impression of
the particular facts before them. What is clear is that none of the circuits adequately protect
defendants' due process rights in the posttrial period.
54. A balancing test was clearly adopted by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Andrews,
633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). The court held that a
trial court must decide whether "a reasonable person would think there existed a realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness." 633 F.2d at 454. "In order to make this assessment, a court must
weigh two factors. First, there is the prosecutor's 'stake' in deterring the exercise of the
right. . . . Second, there is the prosecutor's conduct." 633 F.2d at 454. In adopting this test,
the court expressly rejected the contention that ''the mere appearance of vindictiveness" is
impermissible; instead, it indicated that due process concerns are raised only where there is a
substantial possibility of vindictiveness (633 F.2d at 455) or a probability of vindictiveness.
633 F.2d at 455.
The First Circuit also appears to employ a balancing approach. In Lovett v. Butterworth,
610 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 935 (1980), the court carefully examined
the defendant's interests in a trial de novo and the prosecutor's interest in reindictment and
concluded: "We thus have before us a significant due process interest to weigh against a minor
or nonexistent prosecutorial interest. Therefore, apprehension of vindictiveness by the Commonwealth in the form of an indictment is sufficient to contravene due process." 610 F.2d at
1007. Although the court did not indicate the test that would govern other cases, the method
used in Lovell strongly suggests that the court would look at the circumstances of the case and
balance the competing interests to determine what standard to require. The court's decision in
Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1981), confirms this impression. In that case, the
prosecutor had informed the defendant that he would seek a higher sentence if defendant
exercised her statutory right to a trial de novo in superior court, but did not bring or threaten to
bring a more serious charge. Emphasizing that the prosecutor's sentence recommendation
does not control the judge's decision, that offering a lenient sentence at the first stage of a twotier system is "in no way discreditable," and that a more sweeping rule would amount to a
boundless "invitation to after-the-fact fly-specking," the court rejected defendant's vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus appeal. In so holding, the court explicitly approved a
factual balancing approach: "[f]or the (Pearce] Court to have ended all apprehension would
have required a .rule disallowing any increase in sentence at all. It did not follow this path, but
rather undertook to strike a practical balance between actions deemed to chill appeals excessively and those that do not." 648 F.2d 790, 798. The Koski decision is extensively analyzed in
Comment, Prosecutorial Vmdictiveness: Expanding the Scope of Protection lo increased Sentence Recommendations, 10 GEO. LJ. 1051 (1982).
Finally, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion in United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d
45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1977), suggests that that circuit may also use a balancing test. In Ricard the prosecutor increased the charges after the defendant decided, to go to
trial and also attempted to have certain evidence suppressed. Although the court's decision
was primarily based on the prosecutor's non-vindictive motive (I.e., the fact that the case had
been assigned to a new prosecutor after the original indictment) for the increase in charges, the
court also examined the facts of the case to determine whether there was a sufficient likelihood
of vindictiveness to apply the Blackledge principles. The court pointed out that there was no
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the defendant to prove the existence of actual vindictiveness.55 Finally, several circuits have held that an increase in the severity of
charges following the assertion56 of a procedural right creates a preevidence that the prosecutor wished to avoid a trial and concluded that "given the lack of any
substantial evidence of vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution, the increase in the
charges brought against appellant cannot be said to entrench upon defendant's due process
rights." 563 F.2d at 48. At least in a non-Blackledge situation, this decision appears to require
lower courts to examine the facts of a particular case to determine if a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness exists.
Hence the Second and Sixth Circuits appear to require courts to balance the circumstances
to determine the likelihood of vindictiveness, while the First Circuit requires courts to balance
the competing interests. Either approach suffers similar deficiencies since each requires a caseby-case adjudication. See note 60 infra.
55. Hardwick v. J)oolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 302 (5th Cir.). If the new charge involved the
same conduct as the original charge, an "appearance of vindictiveness" standard would be
used. The court proceeded, however, to take a very broad view of the "different and distinct"
concept. The court held that where the new charges concerned a robbery of a bank customer,
and an assault on a probation officer who was seized and used as a shield in a gun battle with
the police, the charges concerned events that were different and distinct from the bank robbery
that was the basis for the original charge. 558 F.2d at 302. Hence, the prosecutor was permitted to add charges even though the conduct alleged in the new charges arose out of the events
alleged in the original charges. Additionally, there was no indication that the prosecutor had
been unaware of this conduct at the time of the original charges. Under such a broad interpretation of the "different and distinct" events test a prosecutor who carefully frames the new
charges will usually be governed by the actual vindictiveness standard. See generally U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 16 (July 1980) ("Typically,
however, a defendant will have committed more than one criminal act and his conduct may be
prosecuted under more than one statute."). This approach has been criticized elsewhere. See
Gifford, supra note 3, at 357 n.58 ("By creating an artificial and unrealistic label for superseding indictments and by focusing on the prosecutor's actual intentions, the Fifth Circuit has
abandoned the defendant's due process right to pursue his procedural retaliation. This decision is contrary to the majority of lower court applications of the Pearce/Blackledge rule.")
The Hardwick test was modified in Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1978),
where the court specified that "[i]n deciding whether to require a showing of reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness, a court must weigh the extent to which allowing the second indictment will chill the exercise of the defendants' appeal rights against the extent to which
forbidding the second indictment will infringe on the exercise of the prosecutor's independent
discretion." See also Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying the reasonable
apprehension of vindictiveness standard to a case involving harsher charges brought after the
defendant successfully moved for a new trial).
One recent Fifth Circuit case, however, suggests that the actual vindictiveness test will
continue to be employed frequently in the Fifth Circuit. In United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d
436 (5th Cir. 1980), the court applied the actual vindictiveness test to a claim that the prosecutor vindictively increased the charges after the defendants successfully had a number of
charges dismissed. In applying this test, the court said that:
The authority of our decision in Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978) . . . may
be substantially undermined by the Supreme Court decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), an authority which our cases on this
subject do not appear to have taken into account. The dissent in Bordenkircher views that
decision as signalling a general retreat from Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct.
2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); see 434 U.S. at 365-66, 98 S.Ct. at 669-70; and this may be so.
617 F.2d at 438 n.l. The Thomas decision has been viewed as a reaffirmance of the Fifth
Circuit's ''position that a defendant must show actual prosecutorial vindictiveness to establish
a due process violation." Recent Developments, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: An Examination
ofJ)ivergent Lower Court Standards and a Proposed Frameworkfor Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REv.
431, 448 (1981). Thomas has been cited by the Eighth Circuit, which has not yet adopted a
vindictiveness test. See United States v. Gillis, 645 F.2d 1269, 1282 n.30 (8th Cir. 1981).
56. It is not clear how strongly a right must be asserted under any of these tests. In at least
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sumption of vindictiveness.57 Under any of these standards58 the
prosecutor may rebut the defendant's proof by demonstrating an appropriate nonvindictive justification for the increased charges.59
Each of these approaches provides a less restrictive, or at least a
more discretionary, test for prosecutorial vindictiveness than
Black/edge's prophylactic approach. The balancing test, by its very
nature, replaces the prophylactic approach with a case-by-case analysis.60 The actual vindictiveness test, by imposing an extremely
heavy burden on the defendant, greatly reduces the defendant's protection from vindictiveness.61 Even those courts that will presume
vindictiveness in certain circumstances may und.ercut the effectiveone case, a presumption of vindictiveness was established even though the defendant never
exercised the disputed right. See United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.
1977). Additionally, some courts have indicated that even if charges are increased after an
unsuccessful assertion of a right, a vindictiveness inquiry may be required. E.g, Wynn v.
United States, 386 A.2d 695 (D.C. 1978).
57. This approach has been adopted in the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Goodwin, 637
F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1981), revd., 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982); the Ninth Circuit, United States v.
Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1981); and the D.C. Circuit, United States v. Jamison, 505
F.2d 407, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It was also adopted in United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp.
808, 814 (D.NJ. 1977), which is the only case within the Third Circuit that addresses the issue.
58. The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have not expressly adopted a standard yet. The Eighth Circuit has, however, suggested that it favors either a balancing test or
the Fifth Circuit's approach, since it citedAnarews and 'I7zomas in United States v. Gillis~ 645
F.2d 1269, 1282 n.30 (8th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440 (8th Cir.
1978).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). Under the Fifth Circuit's actual vindictiveness approach, defendants presumably would need to show that the prosecutor was in fact motivated by vindictiveness rather than these non-vindictive considerations.
60. As the majority opinion in theAndrews opinion acknowledges, in analyzing the prosecutor's stake in deterring the assertion of a right "[e]ach situation will necessarily tum on its
own facts." United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 927 (1981). See 633 F.2d at 462 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("One of my chief concerns
with the majority opinion is that it provides no guidance to the district courts. The Court does
not even say whether it would find impermissible retaliation on the facts alleged in this case.
After considerable thought, I can only conclude that the phrase 'realistic likelihood of vindictiveness' will have to be given content on a case-by-case basis."), See also United States v.
Schiller, 424 A.2d 51, 59 (D.C. 1980) (Mack, J., dissenting) (arguing that a balancing test "is
contrary to established precedent, inconsistent with due process concerns, and irrelevant to the
purposes for which it is advanced."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981).
61. Since the actual vindictiveness test requires defendants to establish the prosecutor's
state of mind, it imposes an almost impossible burden on defendants. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 n.20 (1969) ("[T]he existence of a retaliatory motivation
would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove in any individual case."); Frank v. Blackbum,
646 F.2d 902,903 n.3 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840 (1981);
United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 251 (6th Cir. 1979), rehg. en bane, 633 F.2d 449
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981) ("An additional complicating factor is the difficulty of
showing actual vindictiveness, which involves a determination of the prosecutor's state of
mind."); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Novosei, 120 N.H. 176,
181, 412 A.2d 739, 743 (1980); Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1542.
The defendant's burden is particularly onerous in view of the fact that courts are likely to
be very reluctant to find that prosecutors have acted in bad faith. See United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 455, 455 n.8 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
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ness of this presumption by freely accepting the prosecutor's nonvindictive justifications.62
By moving away from the prophylactic approach suggested by
Blackledge, courts have seriously eroded the due process protection
afford~d by a prophylactic rule. A primary justification for a prophylactic rule controlling prosecutorial vindictiveness is that it can
either eliminate the risk of vindictiveness, or at least render that risk
so minimal that a defendant will not be discouraged from asserting
important rights. 63 A more l~nient or flexible rule reduces the confi62. The nonvindictive justifications that have been accepted by the courts to overcome a
finding of vindictiveness are too numerous and ill-defined to control vindictiveness adequately.
Justifications accepted by some courts include: prosecutorial zeal, United States v.
Thumhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1977); a changed approach to prosecutorial duty,
Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978);
public demand for prosecutioJ!. of additional offenses, Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978); mistake or oversight, Hardwick, 558 F.2d at
301; Cherry v. State, 414 N.E.2d 301, 305-06 (Ind. 1981); prosecutorial inexperience, United
States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981); protection of an informant, United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978); reassessment by a second prosecutor, United States v. Ricard,
563 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1978); desire to retain option to bring
less serious charges later, Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 149 n.20 (5th Cir. 1978); continu~tion ofan investigation, United States v. Nell, 570 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1978); discovery of new evidence, United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d at 456 n.10; and intervening events,
United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
While retention of some of these justifications is warranted, see notes ro9-11 i'!fra, it is
clear that many courts have too readily accepted the justifications asserted by prosecutors. See
Recent Developments, supra note 55, at 455. {"These courts have accepted as legitimate many
proffered state justifications for increased criminal charges; few of these justifications, however,
should satisfy the compelling interest test when the exercise of a fundamental right is involved."). Acceptance of many of these justifications does not dispel the appearance of vindictiveness, and hence defendants will continue to'be deterred from asserting their rights. See
United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (E.D. Mich. 1978), revd., 612 F.2d 2~5 {6th
Cir. 1979), vacated, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
Hence, in some circuits, Judge Keith's concern that "ready acceptance of glib prosecutorial
explanations for the seeking of heavier charges could make a mockery of Blackledge," United
States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d at 252 (Keith, J., dissenting), may already have become a reality.
For example, requiring a defendant to try to disprove the "nonvindictive" justification of
prosecutorial zeal imposes a burden similar to that under the actual vindictiveness standard i.e., the defendant must prove the prosecutor's state of mind. See note 61 supra. It would also
be extremely difficult for a defendant to refute a prosecutor's assertion that a mistake was
made in selecting the original charge. Moreover, it is manifestly unjust that a prosecutor blundering an investigation should later be able to undermine a defendant'.s right to appeal. Hence,
a number of courts have properly rejected this justification. See, e.g., United States v. Motley,
655 F.2d 186, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, a defendant should not bear the costs of
prosecutorial inexperience. See United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("That the matter was handled by an inexperienced prosecutor . . . is, of course, no
acceptable excuse whatsoever.")
63. In United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977), the court observed that "(t]he prophylactic rule is designed not only to relieve the
defendant who has asserted his right from bearing the burden from 'upping the ante' but also
to prevent chilling the exercise of such rights by other defendants who must make their choices
under similar circumstances in the future." See Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002, 1007
(1st Cir. 1979), ceri denied, 441 U.S. 935 (1982); United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808, 812
(D.NJ. 1977).
·
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dence of defendants that vindictiveness will be controlled. 64 The
Court fashioned the Blackledge rule to eradicate this uncertainty,
and the apprehension of vindictiveness which attends it.
C. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness After Goodwin
The circuit courts must reevaluate their conflicting approaches to
vindictiveness in the light of United States v. Goodwin. 65 The case
involved an incident in which a United States Park Policeman
stopped Goodwin's car, and noticed a clear plastic bag beneath the
driver's side armrest. The officer asked Goodwin to reenter his automobile and raise the armrest. Goodwin indeed returned to his car,
but then put it in gear and drove off, striking the officer with his
vehicle in the process. Goodwin was later arrested, but fled the jurisdiction before trial. Three years later he was apprehended. The
government initially assigned his prosecution to an attorney authorized to try only misdemeanors before a magistrate. Goodwin initiated plea bargaining, but later advised the government that he had
decided to plead not guilty and would insist upon a jury trial in district court. This required reassigning the case to an Assistant United
States Attorney, who sought and received a felony indictment for
assaulting a federal officer. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on
one felony and one misdemeanor count.
The Court held that this course of prosecutorial conduct did not
give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. 66 Justice Stevens, relying on Bordenkircher, reasoned that the substitution of more serious
charges before trial involved both a diminished risk of retaliatory
motivation and a much keener interest in prosecutorial discretion
than such conduct would present after trial. 67 The opinion points
out that initial mistake, new information, or the tactics of plea bargaining may justify more serious charges before trial, but that these
same factors become implausible as justifications for "upping the
ante" after the reversal of a conviction. 68 Thus, the Court concluded, ''the timing of the prosecutor's action in this case suggests
that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted."69 The Court
of course held out the possibility that a showing of actual vindictiveness, even before trial, would establish grounds for overturning a
conviction for more serious offenses.70
If Bordenkircher and Goodwin do no more than limit Blackledge
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See the criticisms of the three approaches discussed in notes 60-62 supra.
102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982).
102 S. Ct. at 2494.
102 S. Ct. at 2492-94.
102 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
102 S. Ct. at 2493 (emphasis added).
102 S. Ct. at 2494.
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to the posttrial setting, it would seem that the circuit courts must
explicitly recognize the pretrial/posttrial distinction drawn in Goodwin, and enforce a presumption of vindictiveness whenever the government brings more serious charges on retrial. But Goodwin does
not discuss circuit court approaches to the vindictiveness doctrine,
and its treatment of Blackledge is ambiguous. 71 Indeed, Goodwin itself says nothing about posttrial prosecutorial conduct.72 Part II,
therefore, analyzes the pretrial/posttrial distinction relied upon in
Goodwin, and concludes that due process requires greater posttrial
protection against vindictiveness than any standard currently applied by the circuit courts.
II. THE

NEED FOR GREATER PROTECTION IN THE
POSTTRIAL CONTEXT

Goodwin distinguished pretrial from posttrial charging decisions,
holding that due process does not require presuming vindictiveness
from the substitution of more serious charges in the former context.
This Part develops the logical corollary of that distinction, and concludes that due process does indeed require such ,.a, presumption in
the posttrial setting. In the posttrial period the defendant's interest
reaches its peak, a significant threat to this interest exists, and the
State's competing interest in prosecutorial discretion is minimal.
The defendant's posttrial interest in the right to appeal demands
the utmost protection. The Supreme Court has recognized the "fun71. Two items in the Court's opinion suggest a potential willingness to reconsider the posttrial presumption of vindictiveness imposed by Blackledge. First, in a peculiar reference to a
binding rule of constitutional law, Justice Stevens framed the issue in the case as "whether a
presumption that has been used to evaluate a judicial or prosecutorial response to a criminal
defendant's exercise of a right to be retried after he has been convicted should also be applied
to evaluate a prosecutor's pretrial response to a defendant's demand for a jury trial." 102 S.
Ct. at 2487 (emphasis added). Second, the opinion quotes the Bordenkircher dictum to the
effect ''that the due process violation in Pearce and Blackledge 'lay not in the possibility that a
defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right . . . but rather in the danger that
the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.' " 102
S. Ct. at 2491. Given that Goodwin also quotes language from Pearce and Blackledge emphasizing the importance of the deterrent consequences of vindictiveness, 102 S. Ct. at 2490, the
Supreme Court's current view of the prophylactic rule laid down by Blackledge cannot be
ascertained with confidence. But, as this Note argues, absent further guidance from the Court,
the holding of Blackledge, and the rationale of Goodwin, combine to require full enforcement
of that prophylactic rule in the posttrial context. Even if the Supreme Court had not spoken to
the issue in Blackledge, the due process analysis developed here would require a firm presumption of vindictiveness when the government brings more serious charges on retrial.
72. Despite the narrow drawing of the opinion, Bordenkircher appears to have contributed
to the relaxation of posllrial vindictiveness standards, a result plainly beyond its intended
holding. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436, 438 n.l (5th Cir. 1978)
(Bordenkircher may signal a general retreat from Blackledge). This suggests that Goodwin,
another decision which does not find vindictiveness in the pretrial setting, may have a similar
effect despite Justice Stevens' meticulous distinction of pretrial and posttrial vindictiveness
standards. See note 11 supra. The reformulation of the vindictiveness doctrine proposed by
this Note, and predicated on that distinction, would preclude such an unfortunate result.
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.damental" nature of this right, 73 and has taken bold measures to preserve the unfettered exercise of it.74
The paramount function of the right to appeal is ''to safeguard
against miscarriages of justice."75 If an innocent defendant is
wrongly convicted, the right to appeal provides an essential opportunity to obtain relief. 76 Moreover, the right to appeal helps prevent
the injustices that occur every time a defendant's rights are violated
at trial, by providing an appellate court an opportunity to remedy
trial court errors, and by deterring prosecutorial misconduct at
trial.77
The important law-making function of appellate review also
compels the vigorous protection of the right to appeal. Because appellate decisions have more general application than trial court decisions, they provide a means for the development of "progressive,
workable, and humane rules of criminal law'' 78 and for assuring that
these rules are applied consistently by trial courts.79
The importance of the right to appeal makes it essential that
courts minimize the risk of prosecutorial vindictiveness in the posttrial period. Even before the Pearce and Blackledge decisions, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals emphatically recognized that a defendant "should not have to fear even the possibility that his exercise
of his right to appeal will result in the imposition of a penalty for so
doing."80
In addition to deterring defendants from appealing, posttrial
prosecutorial vindictiveness contravenes double jeopardy values.
Although the double jeopardy clause does not mandate the rule pro73. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).

14. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state must provide indigents with
appointed counsel on their first appeal granted by state law as a matter of right); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (when transcript is required for appeal, state must provide the cost
of the transcript to indigent seeking review). It has been suggested that the right to appeal may
eventually be recognized as a federal constitutional right. See Eades, Appellate and Post Conviction Reliefin Tennessee, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1974).
As the law now stands, the Constitution does not require the states to grant appeals from
criminal convictions. See, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317,323 (1976). Once
avenues of review are established, however, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the defendant's free exercise of his statutory right. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 17, 25 n.4 (1974). This right is one that is legitimately protected from prosecutorial
vindictiveness. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 17 (1974); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 142
n.3 (5th Cir. 1978).
·
75. Margolis, Criminal Appeals in Motion, 45 CONN. B.J. 114, 117 (1971).
76. Margolis, supra note 75, at 117.
11. See generally Margolis, supra note 75, at 117-18. Prosecutorial misconduct is likely to
be deterred since the prosecutor knows that such misconduct may result in a reversal on
appeal.
18. See Margolis, supra note 75, at 117.
19. See Margolis, supra note 75, at 117.
80. Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1967).
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posed in this Note,81 the values underlying the clause should be considered in evaluating the defendant's interest in being free from
vindictiveness. Prosecutorial vindictiveness following a successful
appeal thwarts the defendant's interest in the :finality of his prior sentence.82 As this consideration is irrelevant prior to the defendant's
conviction, the recognition of double jeopardy values argues for different constraints on prosecutors before and after trial. 83
While the defendant's interest in freedom from prosecutorial vindictiveness reaches its height in the posttrial period, this is also the
period in which vindictiveness is most likely to occur. 84 Before investing their efforts in a full trial, prosecutors have ''less at stake and
less motive to act vindictively." 85 After obtaining a conviction, however, prosecutors have powerful incentives to try to deter appeals. 86
Accordingly, defendants asserting their rights face the greatest risk of
vindictiveness during the posttrial period.
The likelihood that an increase in the severity of charges follow81. See note 18supra. In his concurring opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), Justice Douglas argued that the double jeopardy clause does, in fact, mandate the rule
proposed in this Note. 395 U.S. at 726-27.
82. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,479 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also Brown
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165-67 (1977); Westen, The Three Faces of.Double Jeopardy: Reflections
on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1051 (1980) ("Pearce
was thus relegated to the . . . last of the double jeopardy values, viz., the [defendant's interest]
in finality."). Although Westen suggests that the defendant has less of a finality interest in the
length of sentence than in a determination of guilt or innocence, he acknowledges some interest in length of sentence. Id Additionally, the finality interest in charging seems akin to the
interest in guilt or innocence, since a defendant cannot be found guilty of a charge that was
never brought.
83. This was the prevailing view before Pearce was decided. See, e.g., Honigsberg, Limitations Upon Increasing A .Defendant's Sentence Following A Success.fa/ Appeal and Reconviction,
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 329, 341 (1968); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the
"Success.fa/" Criminal Appellant, 14 YALE L.J. 606, 634-35 (1965). It has, in fact, been suggested that Pearce was actually grounded in double jeopardy values. See United States v.
Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 458 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ([Pearce] and
[Blackledge] fit much better the double jeopardy mold . . . ."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981).
84. The prosecutor's incentive to act vindictively is substantially less at the pretrial stage
than it is during the posttrial period. See note 29 supra and accompanying text; United States
v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct 2485, 2493 (1982) ("[A] change in the charging decision made after an
initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial
decision."); United States v. Schiller, 424 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1980) (request for joint trial less likely
to result in vindictiveness than request for retrial, since less prosecutorial effort exacted); Note,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Relationship Between Prosecutorial .Discretion and Vindictiveness
in Plea Bargaining, 33 ARK. L. REv. 211, 221 (1979) ("[T]he effort expended by the state in
obtaining a conviction requires sufficient involvement to foster a desire to protect the result
obtained.").
85. State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 630, 633 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1981).
86. Since a conviction requires a substantial investment of the prosecutor's limited time
and resources, the prosecutor has a strong interest in retaining the result obtained and in
avoiding the costs of an appeal and possible retrial. See Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1533 ("In
many jurisdictions, available resources permit prosecutors to bring to trial only a small portion
of the cases of intermediate severity that they could win easily, and a still smaller portion of
minor crimes.").

212

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:194

ing a successful appeal results from vindictiveness is magnified by
the limited number of nonvindictive reasons for such action. Except
when the prosecutor discovers substantial new evidence after the
original trial, there is simply no compelling reason for the prosecutor
to increase charges. 87 Consequently, in the absence of substantial
new evidence, such action by the prosecutor should be considered
"inherently suspect."ss
Against the defendant's very strong interest in freedom from the
apprehension of posttrial prosecutorial vindictiveness, and the very
real threat of such vindictiveness, weighs the State's interest in having the opportunity to increase charges at retrial. This State interest
is, as many courts have recognized, minimal. 89 Absent substantial
new evidence, the increased charge simply reflects the prosecutor's
reconsideration of "a previously completed exercise of discretion": 90
the prosecutor has evaluated the evidence previously, has had the
entire pretrial period to determine what charges are merited, and has
made a charging decision. Denying the prosecutor the opportunity
to reconsider this decision following the defendant's assertion of an
essential right still allows the State to pursue the same charges that
the prosecutor considered appropriate at the original trial. Hence,
such a restriction "entails only a minor infringement on the exercise
81. See note 62 supra and notes 104-106 infra; Brief for Respondent at 21, Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) ("[l]t is hard to conceive any motive that a prosecutor might have
other than punitive for the increase in charges following an appeal. The prosecutor is free in
the first instance to place charges at the felony or misdemeanor level If certain conduct mandates criminal charges at the felony level there is no plausible reason why those charged with
that determination are unable to make it in the first instance.")
88. Cf. United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir.) (arguing that a prosecutor's attempt ''to retry the appellant, seeking a heavier penalty far the same acts as originally charged, is inherently suspect .•.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976).
89. See Recent Developments, supra note 55, at 455 ("Although the state in Andrews had a
legitimate interest in prosecuting defendants for the highest offense that their conduct warranted, the prosecutor served that state interest by bringing the initial charge. Thereafter, the
state had no compelling interest in reindicting the defendants on harsher charges based upon
essentially the same conduct as the original indictments.") (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978) (in the Blackledge situation ''there was no
strong countervailing policy of allowing the prosecutor freedom to exercise his discretion in
charging other crimes.''); Cherry v. State, 414 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind.) (limiting the Blackledge
rule to cases involving the substitution of a more serious charge, and not the addition of
charges, "gives too much deference to prosecutorial discretion. Vindictiveness issues are only
present after the state has had ample opportunity to exercise its discretion."); cert. dismissed,
453 U.S. 946 (1981).
90. Cherry v. State, 414 N.E.2d 301,306 (Ind.), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 946 (1981). The
prosecutor has a responsibility to see that the charge selected at the original trial "adequately
describes the offense or offenses committed and provides for an adequate sentence for the
offense or offenses." National District Attorneys Association, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN•
DARDS 131 (1977). See Department of Justice, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 16
(1980) ("Except as hereafter provided, the attorney for the government should charge, or
should recommend that the grand jiµy charge, the most serious offense that is consistent with
the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.").
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of prosecutorial discretion." 91
The State's interest in preserving this recharging discretion is
plainly less in the posttrial period than in the pretrial period. A
number of courts have recognized - both explicitly92 and implicitly93 - the need to allow prosecutors some flexibility in framing,
and reframing, charges before the first trial. Moreover, other pragmatic considerations, such as fear of undue delay94 and the difficulty
of establishing a general standard,95 have led courts to relax the
prosecutorial vindictiveness standard in the pretrial period but have
little application to the posttrial period.
The defendant's essential due process interest in the right to appeal clearly outweighs the government's minimal interest in posttrial
prosecutorial discretion. 96 Because defendants must enjoy a high de91. Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (1982) ("[I]n the course of
preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover additional information that suggests a
basis for further prosecution, or he simply may come to realize that information possessed by
the State has a broader significance."); United States v. Schiller, 424 A.2d 51, 56 (D.C. 1980)
("A prosecutor should have broader leeway to add charges before an initial trial than in a case
where a defendant is to be tried a second time."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981).
93. See note 51 supra:
94. Before trial, defendants might raise spurious allegations of vindictiveness to delay the
proceedings every time a prosecutor brought a superseding indictment. See, e.g., United States
v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449,467 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (Engel, J., dissenting) ("Defense counsel, to avoid a charge of ineffective assistance, will be induced to challenge every superseding
indictment for fear of waiving any claim that it was procured because of vindictiveness.
Where not raised by the defense, the trial court, fearful of the plain error rule or of later
collateral attack, may raise an issue sua sponte."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). While
defendants might do the same thing in a retrial situation, this possibility presents a much less
serious problem since the number of retrials is only a fraction of the number of trials. See
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 415 (1980) (indicating that in the.lower federal courts, during the twelve month period
ending June 30, 1980, 27,725 original criminal proceedings were commenced. During the same
period, only 243 criminal cases were remanded or reopened); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J.
lsRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 24-25 (5th ed. 1980) (suggesting that approximately .
one percent of all criminal cases are reversed on appeal).
95. See United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 247 (6th Cir. 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring) ("The following questions demonstrate, in my mind, the unmanageability of the vindictiveness concept in the trial context: Once a defendant has successfully assened a panicular
legal right in the course of the criminal process, is a prosecutor guilty of unconstitutional vindictive conduct, which "chills" the exercise of the legal right assened, each time the prosecutor
thereafter takes a position contrary to the interest of the defendant? If not, why not, and what
is the standard of measurement?"), revd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 927 (1981). The concern that it is impossible adequately to identify and control all
potential vindictiveness is not, however, a compelling reason not to control vindictive indictments before either trial or retrial Unlike some potential vindictive behavior, an objective
judgment can be made about whether a reindictment has adversely affected a defendant.
Moreover, focusing on reindictments is justified because of the severe consequences they can
cause for defendants. Finally, to the extent that other vindictive conduct is equally identifiable
and deleterious, this argues for expanding the concept of vindictiveness, not retracting it.
96. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In Blackledge the defendant's appeal interest clearly outweighed the government's interest in unfettered prosecutorial
discretion, which in that case involved only the prosecutor's right to reopen a previously com-
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gree of confidence that their decision to appeal will not redound to
their punishment, 97 only a presumptive bar to more serious charges
on retrial can protect this due process interest. Part III advocates a
revitalized presumption of vindictiveness in the posttrial period, and
rebuts the potential objections to such an approach.

Ill. A PROPOSED

RULE

To CONTROL POSTTRIAL PROSECUTORIAL
VINDICTIVENESS

The importance of preserving the defendant's posttrial rights
compels a return to the prophylactic approach suggested by
Blackledge. To minimize the defendant's fear ofposttrial vindictiveness, increased charges98 at retrial99 should be deemed presumptively vindictive. 100 Only the presentation of clear and convincing
pleted exercise of discretion."); Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002, 1007 (1st Cir. 1979) ("We
thus have before us a significant due process interest to weigh against a minor or nonexistent
prosecutorial interest."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980); Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269,
1277 (5th Cir. 1979); Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 35, at 115 ("Although society has an
interest in convicting the defendant for the highest offense his conduct warrants, the prosecutor
serves this interest by bringing the initial charge. Once the charge has been brought, the defendant's interest in a fair trial must be served."). See also Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d
636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967) ("In order to prevent abuses, the policy must necessarily be that the
new sentence shall not exceed the old. Seldom will this policy result in inadequate punishment. -Against the rare possibility of inadequacy, greater weight must be given to the danger
inherent in a system permitting stiffer sentences on retrial . . . ."), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905
(1968).
97. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
98. Increased charges, under this rule, would be charges that resulted in a combined potential sentence greater than the combined potential sentence at the original trial. As the Ninth
Circuit has noted, "[t]he key [to chilling defendant's rights] is the maximum prison term the
defendant faces under the indictment . . . ." United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 189 (9th
Cir. 1981)..
99. It is probably necessary to apply the proposed rule to mistrials as well as retrials after
reversals. See Johnson v. State, 396 A.2d 163, 165 (Del. 1978) (applying Pearce to mistrials).
To do otherwise would be to encourage defendants to wait until after trial before alleging
errors. (If prosecutors are only restricted by reversals, defendants will prefer reversals. Were a
defendant to seek a mistrial during trial, he would not gain this benefit.). Such a result would
waste judicial resources, since cases that should have been declared mistrials will instead continue to a verdict and then be reversed. See United States v. Jamison, SOS F.2d 407,416 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
Moreover, the likelihood of vindictiveness after mistrials is significant, so prosecutors
should be required to justify any subsequent increase in charges. See United States v. Jamison, SOS F.2d at 416 n.15.
100. One might argue that an optimal rule for prosecutors would be the same as the rule
set down for judges in Pearce - that the prosecutor's reasons for increasing the charges upon
retrial iµust "affirmatively appear." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969). See
United States v. Jamison, SOS F.2d 407, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Lee, 435 F.
Supp. 974, 977 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 3.02(c) (Vernon 1974)
(adopting a similar approach as state law).
At the very least, Pearce establishes a minimum standard, below which the standard for
prosecutors should not fall. There are only two possible justifications for setting a lower standard for prosecutors than for judges. First, since prosecutors have traditionally had vast dis-cretion, they should continue to have it. Such analysis, however, puts the cart before the horse:
since prosecutors have vast discretion, new rules ought to grant them vast discretion. A more
reasonable approach is to assess whether or not discretion constitutes sound policy in any
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proof that the prosecutor has subsequently101 discovered substantial102 new evidence103 relating to the defendant 104 should suffice to
overcome this presumption. Additionally, prosecutors should continue to be prohibited, as they are under current case law, 105 from
given case. Indeed, the greater discretion enjoyed by prosecutors may justify an opposit inference. Insofar as prosecutors exercise wider discretion than judges, this extra margin of discretion justifies stricter restraints upon its exercise. See Note, A 'Realistic Likelihood of
Vindictiveness~· l)ue Process Limitations on Prosecutorial Charging l)iscretion, 1981 U. ILL. L.
R.Ev. 693, 713 (prosecutorial discretion exceeds judicial discretion, mandating more stringent
regulation of prosecutorial conduct).
Second, one could argue that since the Pearce rule controls what sentence the defendant
can receive, it obviates the need for a control on charging decisions. The prosecutor, however,
can effectively change sentences by choosing to charge a crime with a higher minimum sentence at the retrial. To prevent this abuse, charging decisions must be restrained.
Simply imposing the Pearce rule on prosecutors would not, in itself, adequately protect
defendants' rights. It is far too easy for a prosecutor to set forth nonvindictive justifications for
his actions. See note 62 supra. CJ. Honigsberg, Limitations Upon Increasing a l)ejendant's
Sentence Following a Succesffal Appeal and Reconviction, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 329, 342 (1968)
(commenting on ease with which judge can provide nonvindictive justifications).
One could argue that if the Pearce rule is adequate to control judges, it should also be
adequate to control prosecutors. The distinction between the position of the judge and the
prosecutor is, however, substantial: prosecutors have more discretion than judges, are more
likely to act vindictively because of their role as an adv!lrsary, and operate less openly than the
courts. See generally Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals far "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 550, 564
(1978). Hence, applying a more stringent standard to prosecutors, as proposed in this Note, is
justified.
101. The new evidence would have to be unearthed after the last indictment before trial
was issued. Since the discovery of new evidence would substantially alter the circumstances
_surrounding the prosecution, the presumption that the original charge was correct could then
be overcome. In all circumstances, a determination by a grand jury that there exists probable
cause that another crime was committed by the defendant after the original trial should be
held to satisfy the proposed rule.
102. "Substantial" evidence is evidence that would make a reasonable prosecutor reevaluate his charging decision.
103. ''New" evidence is evidence that the prosecutor did not know about, and could not
reasonably have known about, before the indictment was issued. ''New evidence" should be
read to encompass the ''legal necessity" exception mandated by the Supreme Court:
This would clearly be a different case if the State had shown that it was impossible to
proceed on the more serious charge at the outset, as in l)iaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442.
In that case the defendant was originally tried and convicted for assault and battery. Subsequent to the original trial, the assault victim died, and the defendant was then tried and
convicted for homicide. Obviously, it would not have been possible for the authorities in
l)iaz to have originally proceeded against the defendant on the more serious charge, since
the crime of homicide was not complete until after the victim's death.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974). See also Culberson v. Wainwright, 453 F.2d
1219 (5th Cir. 1972).
104. One could argue that the Supreme Court has mandated the rule proposed in this
Note. Blackledge relies on an analogy to Pearce. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28
(1974). This Note merely extends the Pearce rule, by analogy, to the prosecutor's posttrial
conduct It then takes into account the judicially recognized incentive for prosecutors to retaliate during the posttrial period, see notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text, and accordingly
places a higher burden of proof on prosecutors than is imposed on judges.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1982) ("In declining to
apply a presumption of vindictiveness, we of course do not foreclose the possibility that a
defendant in an appropriate case might prove objectively that the prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allowed
him to do.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 251 (6th Cir. 1979),
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being actually vindictive 106 at any point during criminal
proceedings.
Properly understood, the Supreme Court precedents defining the
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictivenss require such a presumption.
Admittedly, the rule defended here goes beyond Pearce, for it restricts the justifications for more serious charges on retrial to the discovery of new evidence. But Blackledge plainly imposes such a
restraint on prosecutors after the reversal of a defendant's original
conviction. 107 _Pearce and Blackledge, then, mandate a prophylactic
presumption; Goodwin suggests that this presumption applies most
strongly on retrial. Giving effect to these decisions would require significant modifications in the approaches taken by the circuit courts,
which have seriously weakened the Blackledge rule. But surely it is
more faithful to the principle of stare decisis to reject spurious justifications for more serious charges 108 than to permit the erosion of a
due process protection the Supreme Court intended to establish.
This approach recognizes the need to preserve prosecutorial discretion where substantial new evidence has been discovered. Prosecutors could still increase charges based on new evidence relating to
either the activity covered by the previous indictment 109 or to intervening criminal activity. 110 The State's interest in increasing charges
in these circumstances necessitates this exception. 111 However, because a vindictive prosecutor may find new evidence "easy to generate" artificially, 112 courts should carefully evaluate prosecutorial
(Keith, J., dissenting) ("There is universal agreement in the courts that a finding of actual
vindictiveness warrants immediate imposition of Black/edge's proscriptions."), revd., 633 F.2d
449 (1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
106. It is possible, for instance, that a prosecutor could decrease charges at retrial, yet still
be acting vindictively. If, absent vindictiveness, the charges would have been dropped altogether, vindictiveness has still been impermissibly present in the charging process. In such a
case, any defendant who can establish actual vindictiveness should have legal redress.
107. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
109. If substantial new evidence is discovered the State may have a strong interest in increasing the charges. For example, if new evidence indicates that a convicted misdemeanant
has actually committed a murder, the murder charge should not be barred at retrial. See
United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 n.10 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 927 (1981). See also United States v. Nell, 570 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1978).
·110. Cf. United States v. Jamison, ~05 F.2d 407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (intervening event
may justify increase in charges). Society's interest in punishing lawbreakers requires that defendants who commit additional crimes be prosecuted for those offenses. See generally J.
SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 3 (3d ed. 1978).
111. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974) (recognizing exception where the
State could not proceed on the more serious charge at the original trial).
112. Note, The UnconstitutionalityefPlea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. RE.v. 1387, 1409 (1972).
This is particularly true given that police have been known to perjure themselves to secure
advantages for the prosecutor. See Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at
596-97.
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claims that there is new evidence. 113 To limit this exception, the
courts should require the government to demonstrate that the new
evidence upon which it bases its more serious charges could not have
been gathered with due diligence prior to the original trial. 114 This
requirement would permit more serious charges whenever genuinely
new information justifies them, without permitting a vindictive prosecutor to circumvent the rule.
Several objections to the rule proposed here could be raised. The
most obvious concern is that preventing a prosecutor from freely selecting charges at retrial115 would limit the prosecutor's ability to act
effectively. This objection is, however, unfounded. Because of the
dearth of legitimate nonvindictive reasons for increasing charges at
retrials, 116 prosecutorial interests are not unduly impaired by requiring prosecutors to rely on the charging decisions made at the first
trial. 117 Additionally, since less than one percent of criminal cases
result in retrials, any infringement on prosecutorial discretion is minimal.118 Ample precedent119 justifies imposing such a minor limitation on prosecutorial discretion. 120
113. The proposed rule attempts to reach a suitable compromise by requiring "clear and
convincing proof' of substantial new evidence. These requirements should be rigidly enforced, as this exception could potentially emasculate the rule. See United States v. Tucker,
581 F.2d 602, 606 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978) (''In the natural course of events upon the retrial of a
case, one might normally expect the Government to have available additional testimony and
evidence of a defendant's guilt if for no other reason than that the Government has had additional time to prepare and refine its presentation.").
114. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[A] charge
increase might in some circumstances be justified by intervening events or by new evidence of
which the government was excusably unaware at the time of the first indictment.") (emphasis
added).
115. While the proposed rule places restraints on the charges a prosecutor could bring, the
prosecutor would still be free to substitute charges in the new indictment, as long as this does
not expose the defendant to the risk of a longer sentence. Several courts agree that mere substitution of charges to increase the chance of conviction does not constitute vindictiveness. See
United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1981); Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793,
795 (S.D. Iowa 1969). But see United States v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp. 754, 759-60 (D.R.I. 1980).
116. See notes 62, 87 supra.
117. See notes 89-91 supra.
118. See note 80 supra.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (prosecutor must turn over to
defendant exculpatory evidence whether or not he is requested to do so); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (right to trial by jury limits manner in which prosecutor can try case);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (defendant has right to confront his accusers); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (prosecutor must correct testimony that he knows to be false);
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (double jeopardy limits prosecutorial discretion in charging at retrial). See also Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[I)f Blackledge teaches any lesson, it is that a prosecutor's discretion to reindict a defendant
is constrained by the due process clause."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978).
120. It might be argued that prosecutorial resources invested in the first trial represent a
fixed cost, and that when prosecutors increase charges at retrial they are making a reasonable
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A second possible objection to the proposed rule is that
prosecutorial gamesmanship will thwart the intent of the rule. Prosecutors, denied the opportunity to increase charges at retrial, could
simply request increased sentences at retrial. This argument depends
on the questionable assumption that prosecutors will have both the
desire 121 and the opportunity122 to take such action effectively.
Moreover, even should a prosecutor make such a request, it is unlikely to have an effect on the sentence imposed by the judge, 123 particularly since Pearce requires a judge to justify affirmatively an
increased sentence. 124 Finally, the suggestion that prosecutors might
effort to recover on both these fixed costs and the additional costs incurred during the second
trial. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 445 (11th ed. 1980).
This fixed cost argument should be rejected for several reasons. First, it assumes that a
prosecutor's "payback" comes exclusively in the form of prison sentences. Theoretically, at
least, the prosecutor's payback comes in the form of''.justice" which ought not to be affected by
the defendant's request for a new trial.
Moreover, given that prison capacity, rather than the charging decision, imposes the ultimate constraint on imprisoning any individual defendant, this fixed cost approach would necessarily result in injustice. See generally N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST
PoLmcIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 111-12 (1970); Blumstein & Cohen,A 'I7teoryojthe
Stability ojPunishment, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 200-02 (1973). If the particular
defendant receives a longer sentence as a result of the prosecutor's fixed cost analysis, some
other convict must be freed. If, however, the particular defendant does not receive an increased prison sentence, the prosecutor has not received his payback. Thus, prison time cannot
be the currency of prosecutorial charging decisions.
Finally, if the State commits error at the first trial - which was necessarily found if the
defendant's appeal is successful - it is manifestly unjust that the "cost" of this error be imposed on the defendant. Rather, the State, which erred, ought to bear the cost of its mistake.
See United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 256 (6th Cir. 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting) ("The
only reason why prosecutorial vindictiveness problems exist in the first place is that the prosecutor's office bungled things."), revd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 4S0
U.S. 927 (1981).
121. Because a multitude of factors, such as the strength of testimony of opposing witnesses and the emotional appeal of the prosecution's case, affect a prosecutor's sentencing requests, the independent influence of vindictiveness may be negligible. See Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 n.13 (1973).
122. In any case where the prosecutor requested the highest possible sentence at the original trial, it will be impossible for him to retaliate by requesting a higher sentence at retrial.
Other constraints may also limit the prosecutor's ability to effectively seek an increased sentence. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 n.13 (1973) ("Given these practical considerations, and constrained by the bar against his informing the jury of the facts of the prior
conviction and sentence, the possibility that a harsher sentence will be obtained through
prosecutorial malice seems remote.").
123. Since prosecutors routinely seek higher sentences than they expect to receive, the sentencing authority can be expected to discount a prosecutor's vindictive requests. See Chaffin v.
Synchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 n.13 (1973). See also Schulhofer, JJue Process ojSentencing, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 733, 757 (1980) (arguing that prosecutors' charging discretion has little impact
on sentencing).
124. See notes 25-26 supra. The lower courts have consistently enforced the Pearce limitation on judicial vindictiveness. See, e.g., United S~tes v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 648 (9th
Cir. 1981) (post-sentence conviction on state charges does not justify increase); Jacobs v.
Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (purported justification for more severe sentence insufficient), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980)); United States v. Marcus, 603 F.2d 409,
-414 (2d Cir. 1979) (increased sentence predicated on presentencing conduct disallowed). For
an explanation of why this rule would adequately control judges, but not prosecutors, see note

100supra.
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resort to such tactics hardly argues again~t controlling posttrial
prosecutorial discretion. Instead, if this argument has any validity,
the appropriate response should be to reinforce controls over such
prosecutorial requests and, if necessary, to strengthen the Pearce
standard. 125
Finally, 126 one might object to the proposed rule on the basis of a
different sort of prosecutorial gamesmanship. Prosecutors might_
overcharge at the original trial to assure flexibility in case of reversal.127 As with the preceding argument, however, it is nonsensical to
suggest that this possibility of abuse requires courts not to control
abuses at later stages in the proceedings. 128 In addition, there is .
good reason to believe that this possibility is remote. The objection
assumes an unrealistic degree of rationality in charging decisions. 129
Prosecutors do not consider the possibility of reversal when they
make the initial charging decision, 130 so they are unlikely to increase
125. Prosecutors do, of course, have numerous opportunities to take vindictive actions.
Hence, prosecutors theoretically can respond to limitations on any particular opportunity by
acting vindictively at a different point in the proceedings. If, however, a prosecutor is this
committed to vindictive action, it certainly does not mean that it is pointless to try to control
such abuses. To the contrary, it points to the need for even greater control over prosecutorial
discretion.
126. There is one other possible objection to the proposed rule, but it is utterly without
substance. One could argue that a rule restricting charges at retrial will encourage "frivolous
appeals." This is not compelling, however, for several reasons. First, by authorizing appeals of
right, legislatures have agreed to pay the cost of any appeals that are taken. Second, there is no
reason to think that a greater percentage of the ''new'' appeals under the proposed rule will be
frivolous than are frivolous under the existing format. The threat of vindictiveness undoubtedly deters genuine, as well as frivolous, potential appeals. Finally, even under the proposed
rule, appeals are costly to defendants. They must still expend time and money in exercising
their right to appeal, and perhaps most importantly will continue to face the possibility of an
increased sentence on retrial. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719 (1969);
United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1174-75 (4th Cir. 1976).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 1981) (Widener, J.,
dissenting), revd, 102 S. Ct. 2941 (1982).
128. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
129. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1548-49 (footnote omitted) ("[P)rosecutors
do not deploy law enforcement resources with care. . . . It is ••• often [a] haphazard process,
rather than a carefully planned deployment of prosecutorial resources, that must be considered
in judging discretionary power."); Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutoria/ JJiscretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. I, 8-9 (1971); Givelberg, The Application ofEqual
Protection Principles lo Selective Eeforcement ofthe Criminal Law, 1973 U. ILL. LF. 88, 10304.
130. See, e.g., J. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DECISION 7 (1977); Comment,
supra note 3, at 491-98. These analyses of charging decisions nowhere suggest that the possibility of reversal is considered by prosecutors. If this factor is not considered by abstract analysts, it seems even less likely that prosecutors take it into account in their daily decisionmaking. See generally Abrams, Prosecutorial Charge JJecision Systems, 23 UCLA L. REv. I
(1975).
One might argue that-although prosecutors do not currently consider the possibility of reversal in making their charging decisions, they will start to consider it after the proposed rule is
adopted. Obviously, empirical data on this issue is not available. Logically, however, it seems
unlikely that a prosecutor faced with such basic considerations as the defendant's actual guilt
or innocence, the effort involved in preparing the case, and the influence of public opinion on
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charges on the basis of this consideration. Finally, because prosecutors who overcharge face the risk that juries will acquit against the
weight of the evidence, 131 and that judges will adjust the sentence to
compensate for overcharging, 132 it is unlikely that prosecutors will
take such action as a safeguard against the remote possibility that a
defendant's conviction may be appealed and reversed. 133
CONCLUSION

The concept of prosecutorial vindictiveness potentially encompasses all prosecutorial action at every stage of a criminal proceeding. Because the balance of interests between the defendant and the
State is shifting throughout the proceeding, it is hardly surprising
that no satisfactory standard for assessing allegations of vindictiveness has been devised. Instead of attempting to develop a single standard to control vindictiveness, courts should, following Goodwin,
recognize the critical differences between pretrial and posttrial
prosecutorial vindictiveness. If courts take account of this distinction, and adopt a prophylactic rule to protect the defendants' overriding interests during the po_sttrial period, they will spare
defendants the "grisly choice" imposed by the risk 9f posttrial
vindictiveness. 134

the case, would start to take more abstract legal considerations into account as a result of this
rule.
131. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 640 (1980) (when juries acquit against the evidence, they create their own sentencing discretion); Westen, supra note 82, at 1012-23.
132. See note 123 supra.
133. See note 94 supra.
134. q: Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636,639 (4th Cir. 1967) (discussing the "grisly
choice" defendants face when forced to choose between not appealing their convictions or
appealing at the risk of a harsher sentence at retrial).

